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Abstract
It was long considered to be impossible to learn grammar based on linguis-
tic experience alone. In the past decade, however, advances in usage-based
linguistic theory, computational linguistics, and developmental psychology
changed the view on this matter. So-called usage-based and emergentist ap-
proaches to language acquisition state that language can be learned from
language use itself, by means of social skills like joint attention, and by
means of powerful generalization mechanisms. This paper ﬁrst summarizes
the assumptions regarding the nature of linguistic representations and pro-
cessing. Usage-based theories are nonmodular and nonreductionist, i.e.,
they emphasize the form-function relationships, and deal with all of lan-
guage, not just selected levels of representations. Furthermore, storage and
processing is considered to be analytic as well as holistic, such that there
is a continuum between children’s unanalyzed chunks and abstract units
found in adult language. In the second part, the empirical evidence is re-
viewed. Children’s linguistic competence is shown to be limited initially,
and it is demonstrated how children can generalize knowledge based on
direct and indirect positive evidence. It is argued that with these general
learning mechanisms, the usage-based paradigm can be extended to multi-
lingual language situations and to language acquisition under special cir-
cumstances.
1. Introduction
What is the exact form and content of the uniquely human capacity to
learn language? There must be a genetic component in this capacity be-
cause every normally developing child is able to learn language, and there
must be an environmental component because no one is born with a spe-
ciﬁc language.
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A powerful solution to the acquisition problem is the assumption that
innate linguistic structure helps the child overcome the (possible) under-
speciﬁcation of language structure in the input. In this view, the input
has to be mapped onto innate linguistic categories, but the categories or
principles of core syntax do not have to be learned because they are there
right from the beginning. But innate structure, as rich as it may be, can-
not account for the acquisition of language-speciﬁc properties, such as the
lexicon of a language or the inﬂectional morphology of German or
Dutch. These language-speciﬁc properties must be derived from the input
over a number of years. In contrast, the so-called emergentist and usage-
based approaches to language acquisition, that have become prominent in
the past decade, are based on the assumption that language structure can
be learned from language use by means of powerful generalization abili-
ties (e.g., Elman et al. 1996; Tomasello 2003a). The rationale of acquisi-
tion theory has changed accordingly: if the child has to learn the irregular
and peculiar aspects of a language by general learning mechanisms, these
mechanisms should su‰ce to learn the more general and predictable pat-
terns of that language as well.
In Section 2 the theoretical assumptions underlying usage-based ap-
proaches to language and language acquisition will be reviewed, and in
Section 3 the major lines of empirical research that test and provide evi-
dence for these assumptions will be presented. The paper concludes with a
short discussion of the application of usage-based approaches to other sit-
uations regarding language learning like multilingualism and language
disorders (Section 4) and an outline of the major open issues and ﬁelds
for new developments (Section 5).
2. Theoretical issues
2.1. Usage-based linguistics
To explain language learning it must be clear what has to be learned.
Thus, language acquisition theories are intertwined with linguistic
theories on the representation of linguistic structure in adults. The usage-
based approach to language acquisition relies on insights from cognitive
linguistics, a nonmodular theory that assumes that linguistic structure is
tied to the semantics and pragmatics it encodes (e.g., Langacker 1987,
1988, 2000; cf. Kemmer and Barlow 2000 for a summary). The term
‘‘usage-based’’ goes back to Langacker’s assumption that a speaker’s lin-
guistic system is grounded in concrete usage events or utterances (Lan-
gacker 1987). This means that the linguistic system is built-up from usage
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events of particular symbolic units. With increasing linguistic experience,
more abstract linguistic patterns may evolve, but still the assumption is
that these more abstract patterns are grounded in usage. Joan Bybee sum-
marizes the usage-based perspective.
While all linguists are likely to agree that grammar is the cognitive organization
of language, a usage-based theorist would make the more speciﬁc proposal that
grammar is the cognitive organization of one’s experience with language. [ . . . ]
[C]ertain facets of linguistic experience, such as the frequency of use of particular
instances of constructions, have an impact on representation that we can see evi-
denced in various ways, for example, in speakers’ recognition of what is conven-
tionalized and what is not, and even more strikingly in the nature of language
change. The proposal [ . . . ] is that the general cognitive capabilities of the human
brain, which allow it to categorize and sort for identity, similarity, and di¤erence,
go to work on the language events a person encounters, categorizing and entering
in memory these experiences.
The result is a cognitive representation that can be called a grammar. This
grammar, while it may be abstract, since all cognitive categories are, is strongly
tied to the experience that a speaker has had with language. (Bybee 2006: 711)
In usage-based theory there is no level of grammar that is independent of
language use, rather, all abstract grammatical rules were at some point
induced from concrete and particular usage events.1 Langacker speciﬁes
the mental representation of a usage-based grammar as follows:
The grammar lists the full set of particular statements representing a speaker’s
grasp of linguistic conventions, including those subsumed by general statements.
Rather than thinking them an embarrassment, grammarians regard particular
statements as the matrix from which general statements (rules) are extracted.
(Langacker 1987: 46)
A number of implications follow from this statement: Cognitive Gram-
mar is nonreductionist and maximalist: it does not strive to reduce lan-
guage to as abstract a rule system as possible, because particular (lexi-
cally speciﬁc) and abstract phenomena are the same in kind, namely
symbolic form-function units. Parsimony of storage and representation is
not the goal of the theory, nor the underlying assumption of how gram-
mar works. Consequently, usage-based grammar is maximalist, because it
considers idiosyncratic phenomena, low-level schemas, as well as very
productive schemas with general, rule-like properties. Langacker explic-
itly rejects formalist approaches to grammar which make a division
between words and rules that operate words (e.g., Pinker 1999), and con-
siders the division between rules and lists a fallacy because fully regular as
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well as subregular phenomena can be handled in the same fashion with-
out evoking two dichotomous processes (Langacker 2000: 57–60).
But how do the generalization of schemas and regular aspects of a lan-
guage work? Here, usage-based grammar relies on established learning
mechanisms as attested in other cognitive domains as well (Tomasello
1998a: ix–xiv).
2.2. Generalization in usage-based theories
2.2.1. Entrenchment, categorization, and schema formation. In usage-
based linguistics, a few basic psychological processes can account for a
linguistic structure (cf. Langacker 2000: 3–5; see Langacker 1987: 485–
495 for a glossary of the terms used): A central cognitive phenomenon is
entrenchment, the fact that repeated encounter of a unit leaves memory
traces that stabilize the more often this unit recurs. Entrenchment is in-
volved in psychological processes such as routinization and automization,
and applies to smaller units like words as well as ‘‘prepackaged’’ larger
units or constructions, if they can be retrieved without attention to detail.
However, repetition alone does not lead to the abstraction of more gen-
eral information. In order to generalize and form categories, the mind
must recognize similarities as well as dissimilarities. It ﬁlters out aspects
that do not recur, and registers commonalities by comparing stored with
new units. New units are categorized along those dimensions where simi-
larities with stored units are detected. Through abstraction and general-
ization, schemas are formed. Langacker (1987: 492) deﬁnes a schema as
a ‘‘semantic, phonological, or symbolic structure that, relative to another
representation of the same entity, is characterized with lesser speciﬁcity
and detail’’. Schemas unite experiences from an overarching perspective.
We can look at one and the same entity from di¤erent perspectives and
degrees of granularity. For example, a speaker can assess commonalities
between usage-events from a coarser perspective even when the items do
not have much in common on the surface level: There is a range of
low-level schemas that share, for example, a lot of lexical material up to
very abstract schemata (e.g., transitive sentences as an abstract category).
Schema formation is made possible, for example, by type variation.
Whereas high token frequency leads to entrenchment and storage as
‘‘chunk’’, type frequency leads to the recognition of analogies between
constructions (Bybee 2006, see Section 3.2.1 below).
Schema formation and categorization can account for the extraction
of very abstract rule-like phenomena that are not tied to speciﬁc lexical
material.
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2.2.2. Compositionality and emergence. Since usage-based approaches
emphasize the necessity of experience in order to form linguistic and non-
linguistic categories, one might conclude that learners cannot go beyond
their experience. However, since children have powerful generalization
mechanisms, they can generalize new structures based on previous experi-
ence (O’Grady 2005; cf. Gentner 2003; see Section 3.3 below for exam-
ples). Schemas can be integrated to form larger units by means of compo-
sition. It is characteristic of the new unit that compositionality is only
partial, because the composite structure does not just equal the sum of
the parts (Langacker 2000: 3–5). In particular, the composite structure
typically has new qualities that emerge. For example, combining two
sounds to a cluster will change the motor patterns necessary for their
execution.2
The term emergentism emphasizes the idea that qualitatively new
and more complex structures can emerge from simpler, basic facts (Mac-
Whinney 1999: ix). Emergence is thus a central component of the human
language learning capacity since linguistic knowledge emerges from the
child’s interaction with the ambient language.
2.3. Nature and nurture: evolution, species speciﬁcity, and modularity
The main tenet of usage-based and emergentist theories of acquisition is
that the linguistic structure is an emergent property of language use, i.e.,
the child is not innately equipped with speciﬁcally linguistic representa-
tions (‘‘representational nativism’’). Marchman and Thal (2005) summa-
rize the di¤erence as follows:
Both emergentist and nativist approaches share the appreciation that the acquisi-
tion of grammar is a very complex and special human accomplishment. In the na-
tivist view, however, children are special because they ‘‘have’’ something (i.e., a
domain-speciﬁc genetic endowment for particular kinds of representations with
particular kinds of computational processes). In an emergentist view, in contrast,
children are special because what they have enables them to do something, i.e.,
they construct an impressive system of grammar using domain-general skills.
(Marchman and Thal 2005: 144)
The insistence on inductive learning does not mean that usage-based
theories assume that children’s mind is a blank slate, to be conditioned
by behaviorist conditioning practices (Bates 1997; Tomasello 2003a).
The very principle of emergentism is that a combination of smaller quan-
titative di¤erences can produce a new quality, for example, human lan-
guage as opposed to the communication systems found in other species
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(Elman et al. 1996; Tomasello and Rakoczy 2003). Regarding universals,
the notion of emergence is of particular importance because it allows us to
account for universal behavior and structures without having to assume
innate representation that is responsible for this universal manifestation.
For example, all human beings with unimpaired motor skills eat with
their hands rather than their feet. This can be explained without assuming
an ‘‘eating-with-hands gene’’ by the assumption that all humans share the
same physical endowment (limbs, mouth) and face the same task (the
need to eat). To insert food to mouth with hands proves to be the most
e‰cient way to solve this task, although it is by no means the only possi-
ble way. Likewise, when standing in line at the supermarket, all lines will
tend to be equally long. This is not because humans have a genetic predis-
position to make queues match in length. Rather, matching queue length
is an emergent result of the individual’s desire to spend as little time as
possible waiting in line. Regarding language, emergence can be observed
in a number of phenomena: the basic idea is that language structure
emerges from the processes of listening and producing speech (MacWhin-
ney 1999: xi). For example, Gupta and Dell (1999) argue that the struc-
tural properties of language emerge from serial order and procedural
memory.
Gentner (2003) sees the lack of innate linguistic endowment as an evo-
lutionary advantage. She argues that an organism has higher adaptive
power if the innate component is as small as possible, and if the organism
has powerful generalization abilities instead. While innate speciﬁcations
at ﬁrst glance seem to facilitate development, a richly speciﬁed innate
component makes organisms more vulnerable and less ﬂexible or adap-
tive, whereas a powerful ‘‘generalizer’’ can easily adapt to new circum-
stances. In sum, the concept of emergence tries to explain how relatively
small genetic and behavioral di¤erences lead to wide-ranging di¤erences
in cognitive abilities, including the competence to use a full-ﬂedged lin-
guistic system (see Elman et al. 1996 for a detailed explanation).
If it can be shown that the symbolic units of a language can be derived
from a human’s experience with language, innate language-speciﬁc repre-
sentations are not necessary (see also Elman et al. 1996; MacWhinney
1999; Tomasello 2003a):
Just as plausible [ . . . ] is the hypothesis that language rests on more general bio-
logical predispositions, such as the abilities to create and learn symbols, to form
concepts and categories, to process vocal-auditory information rapidly, and to in-
teract and communicate with other people intersubjectively. (Tomasello 1998a: xi)
The human capacity to learn language may be enhanced by humans’
advanced social cognition (e.g., greater tendency to use joint attention
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and intention reading, greater tendency to transmit knowledge explicitly,
greater skills of pattern recognition, and an advanced ability for inferenc-
ing, as compared to nonhuman primates, Tomasello 2003a).3
While usage-based approaches are functional approaches to acquisi-
tion in the sense that the communicative function of a symbolic unit is
a major driving force in acquisition, they do not consider semantics
or concepts as being more important than distributional factors. Given
the symbolic nature of linguistic units, both contribute to one another
(see the discussion of Weinert in this issue for related ﬁndings that
show that semantic information does not seem to be the driving force for
acquisition).
By virtue of being nonreductionist and by assuming a limited set of
psychological processes that can explain how structure emerges from us-
age, usage-based approaches o¤er a domain-general perspective on lan-
guage, language learning, and language change. A fundamental di¤erence
to modern generative versions of grammar is the assumption that all
linguistic units are symbolic, i.e., pairings of (written or phonetic) form
and meaning. This implies that usage-based linguistics is nonmodular,
since all formal aspects of a unit contribute to its semantics. The non-
modularity of linguistic representation also implies that bootstrapping
mechanisms in the technical sense where learning is made possible by
an interface between levels of representation (see Ho¨hle this issue) do not
apply.
2.4. Language-speciﬁc versus domain-general learning mechanisms
To date, usage-based and emergentist approaches o¤er a more compre-
hensive view on acquisition than those based on universal grammar. The
main di¤erences concern the assumptions regarding speciﬁcally linguistic
representations: Whereas Generative Grammar relies on innate univer-
sal representations4 as the prerequisite for language development (see
Eisenbeiß this issue), emergentist approaches see linguistic structure as
the result of nonlinguistic cognitive processing (Bates and Goodman
1999). Here, the focus of interest is to explain how di¤erent cognitive
skills interact to produce a qualitatively new skill, namely complex hu-
man language system (e.g., Smith 1999).
It follows that usage-based approaches do not make a distinction be-
tween (universal) core syntax and other properties of language. Rather,
all linguistic phenomena are considered to be form-function correspon-
dences. They may di¤er in size (from morphemes to idioms) and in de-
grees of abstractness or schematicity and productivity. Because of this,
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a usage-based approach is ultimately more parsimonious than a UG-
approach: First, it does not require a separate innate endowment just for
the purpose of language. Moreover, the same mechanisms will account
for the acquisition of all of language, i.e., one does not assume separate
learning mechanisms like triggering or maturation that solely serve the
purpose of activating and setting the language-speciﬁc parameters of
UG.
2.5. Mental representation and processing
Regarding language representation and processing, utterances do not nec-
essarily have to be generated from scratch: speakers of a language may
access high-frequent or idiomatic structures as a whole, and they store
prefabricated chunks as well as the component parts (Bybee and Scheib-
man 1999; Dabrowska 2004: 18–22). The proposal that adults store
structures on various levels of abstraction — from fully analyzed to fully
frozen — relates to previous ﬁndings in language acquisition research that
children might operate with constructions that are less analyzed than
those of adults. They may produce several transitive sentences, but may
not be able to produce the same construction with new words (Tomasello
2000a, 2000b). That is, children’s constructions can be correct and error-
free, yet formulaic or lexically speciﬁc.
MacWhinney (2004: 910–911) argues that item-based processing is the
major aspect of data-driven acquisition theory that relies on positive evi-
dence and indirect negative evidence alone. The importance of individual
usage events is also prominent in so-called exemplar-based models of lin-
guistics (cf. Bybee 2006). Here, it is assumed that each exemplar is stored.
The question then is how is storage a¤ected by experience? Do we store
all exemplars in the literal, verbatim way? Or do the stored exemplars
accumulate more abstract properties such that we categorize them as in-
stances of a syntactic or morphological schema, or is the concrete lexical
material still relevant (see Bybee 2006)? In cognitive linguistics, no such
distinction has to be made: Langacker (1987) speaks of the ‘‘rule-list-
fallacy’’ of the words-and-rules model (Pinker 1999). The words-and-
rules model proposes that for reasons of economy linguistic units are
either stored analytically if they can be processed by rules, or holistically
if they are irregular or idiomatic. Langacker argues that there is no rea-
son to assume that analytic and holistic storage are mutually exclusive
(Langacker 1987: 42; Bybee and Scheibman 1999; see also Jackendo¤
1997; Pinker and Jackendo¤ 2005).
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2.6. Is there poverty of the stimulus?
The emergentist perspective is further motivated by a certain stagnation
in generativist acquisition theory. The widespread consensus about an in-
nate language-speciﬁc component is not accompanied by similar scientiﬁc
agreement about the exact nature of this innate component nor about the
exact mechanisms by which it becomes activated (see Eisenbeiß [2002] for
a recent survey). But the postulate of innateness can only be tested if there
is a very concrete deﬁnition of what this knowledge includes. The claim
that certain syntactic structures cannot be learned on the basis of positive
evidence (i.e., the language the child hears) is a very powerful and com-
plex prediction. For a real poverty-of-the-stimulus situation, three con-
ditions have to be met: (1) the structure under investigation indeed is
inaccessible from the input, (2) such evidence is indispensable, i.e., the
structure could not be inferred by other means, and (3) children indeed
acquired the underlying structure that is postulated (cf. Akhtar et al.
2004: 142). There is a vivid debate on whether there are linguistic phe-
nomena for which the pragmatic and linguistic cues in the input are
underspeciﬁed (e.g., question formation from embedded clauses, ana-
phoric reference, or argument structure). These discussions have taken
place in a series of target articles and replies. Crain and Pietroski 2002;
Pullum and Scholz 2002; and several other papers in a special issue of
The Linguistic Review dealt with the learnability of question formation
in complex sentences. Lidz et al. 2003a proposed poverty-of-the-stimulus
claims for children’ acquisition of argument structure (see the response by
Goldberg 2004 and the reply by Lidz and Gleitman 2004). Likewise, there
is an ongoing discussion whether children’s early and successful interpre-
tation of anaphoric pronouns is due to innate syntactic knowledge (Lidz
et al. 2003b; Lidz and Waxman 2004) or whether it can be inferred on se-
mantic grounds (Akhtar et al. 2004; Tomasello 2004) or Bayesian learn-
ing procedures that are sensitive to the absence of certain input patterns
(Regier and Gahl 2004).
This discussion shows that the main divide between nativist and emer-
gentist proposals is whether there are aspects of syntax that cannot be
learned empirically (see Culicover and Nowak 2003 for a dynamic sys-
tems perspective on learning from a Minimalist vantage point). The argu-
ment for innateness is not only that a structure cannot be learned in prin-
ciple, but also that the children display linguistic abilities at a very young
age where learning is unlikely (Lidz and Gleitman 2004). Hence, it does
not su‰ce to demonstrate that a computer can learn a complex structure
based on positive evidence, but it has to be demonstrated that a two-year-
old can do it, too. In this vein, proponents of a usage-based approach are
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inspired by recent evidence that even very young infants and children are
sensitive to statistical generalizations in the language they are exposed to
(e.g., Aslin et al. 1999; Newport and Aslin 2004). This ability certainly
plays a role in language-speciﬁc learning, but might also su‰ce to explain
those aspects of grammar for which concrete poverty-of-the-stimulus
claims have been made (see Pullum and Scholz 2002; Elman 2003; Mac-
Whinney 2004). If this were the case, the usage-based model would o¤er a
more parsimonious account of language acquisition because all of acqui-
sition would be accounted for by only one model and with mechanisms
attested in other cognitive domains. So what are the mechanisms for gen-
eralizing knowledge from positive evidence?
2.7. Statistical learning
Usage-based acquisition theory does not assume language-particular
learning mechanisms but relies on mechanisms known from psychology.
Moreover, there are conceptual relationships to computational ap-
proaches to language learning, known under headings such as connec-
tionist modeling, probabilistic grammars, and distributional, stochastic,
or statistical learning (e.g., Redington et al. 1998; Mintz et al. 2002;
Newport and Aslin 2004). The linguistic background for these implemen-
tations is provided by stochastic grammars (Bod 2003; Jurafsky 2003;
Manning 2003). Probabilistic approaches to syntax include Bayesian sta-
tistics of conditional probabilities, i.e., distributional properties, and en-
tropy measures of information processing i.e., assumptions about the
amount of information that is processed in a particular variable (see Bod
et al. 2003; Manning 2003; Manning and Schu¨tze 1999). Connectionist
models of language learning investigate how a neural network can dis-
cover structural properties (see Elman et al. 1996; Westermann et al. this
issue). The leading hypothesis is that linguistic experience is so rich that it
guides learners functionally and stochastically to the structures they learn
(see Manning 2003; Gupta and Dell 1999; Klein andManning 2002, 2004).
That is, competence arises from performance (Allen and Seidenberg 1999).
In developmental psychology, the dynamic systems theory (Thelen and
Smith 1994; van Geert 1994) explains development with similar concepts:
categories are gradient with fuzzy boundaries rather than absolute, and
developmental progress does not proceed in a linear growth curve but
shows variability in the form of plateaus and sudden developments.
Each individual is considered a dynamic system whose progress is best
predicted by this individual’s prior experience (cf. Hohenberger and
Peltzer-Karpf this issue; Hockema and Smith this issue).
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3. Empirical evidence
I will review two research traditions in the usage-based approach to lan-
guage. Since it is assumed that children’s early knowledge is item based
and becomes (partially) productive only gradually, two types of investiga-
tion are critical to such a theory:
(a) the degree to which children’s linguistic competence is limited.
(b) the processes which allow children to generalize
Three types of empirical studies are conducted to provide support for and
test the theory:
First, studies that challenge the claim that children’s early performance
is adult-like. This type of evidence is taken to prove that children’s early
categories are not abstract and category general, but — for example —
lexically speciﬁc. Second, studies that show that children’s early usage is
input-based, i.e., can be related to positive evidence that children receive.
Third, studies that show that children’s progress in language development
can be explained by general social and cognitive skills and domain-
general learning processes. In Section 3.1 I will summarize studies that in-
vestigate the constraints in children’s early linguistic knowledge. Section
3.2 and Section 3.3 will deal with children’s generalization over positive
evidence, and their induction of knowledge without positive evidence,
respectively.
3.1. Islands and slot and frame patterns
That early child language is (partially) formulaic and item-based is one of
the cornerstones of usage-based acquisition theories. Observations of this
kind ﬁrst became introduced with Braine’s concepts of limited scope for-
mulae (Braine 1976), and are also known as slot and frame patterns (Pine
and Lieven 1997; Lieven et al. 1997; Pine, Lieven and Rowland 1998).
These terms indicate that children’s internal representation of a construc-
tion may di¤er from that of adults. Although children’s utterances look
adult like, distributional analyses show that parts of the utterance are
likely to represent unanalyzed chunks that act like a frame into which (a
limited number of ) words or phrases can be inserted.
Tomasello (1992) introduced the notion of ‘‘islands’’ of development.
The underlying idea is that ﬁrst usages of categorically similar verbs
(e.g., transitive verbs or ditransitive verbs) do not provide evidence for
verb-general categories, i.e., an abstract representation of transitivity or
ditransitivity, but that each individual transitive verb may be used in a
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di¤erent lexical frame, without much overlap between those frames. In
the course of development, then, the child recognizes relationships be-
tween such constructions such that the sentence schemas become more
verb-general and less item-speciﬁc.
3.1.1. Early productivity. Although it seems to be uncontroversial that
some aspects of early child language are lexically speciﬁc, there is a de-
bate about what lexical speciﬁcity really means in terms of productivity,
and how prevalent it is. A controversial and as of yet open issue is
whether item-based formulas are the starting point for each aspect of lan-
guage development, and whether item-based learning is equally relevant
crosslinguistically. It is under debate whether children’s competence is
really as limited as proposed by some authors. Based on results from a
diary study on sentences produced with a list of common verbs, Vear
et al. (2002) argue that English-speaking children generalize earlier than
proposed in the studies by Tomasello and colleagues. The diary data col-
lected by Vear et al. (2002) suggest that not all children go through a verb
island stage. However, these results are not incompatible with usage-
based learning. It seems plausible that children take the abstract lexical
and syntactic knowledge they have already acquired, instead of going
through item-speciﬁc learning again and again. Abbot-Smith and Behrens
(2006) argue that even very complex constructions can be acquired
quickly, provided children command the component parts of the new
complex construction. For example, the German passive is acquired
rather easily because children can build on other auxiliary constructions.
Since in spoken language the ‘‘by phrase’’ is almost always omitted, the
verbal passive (1) is very similar to present perfect constructions (2).
They only di¤er in the auxiliary.
(1) verbal passive
das Kind wird gewaschen
‘the child is being washed’
(2) present perfect
das Kind hat gewaschen
‘the child has washed (something)’
Interestingly, the resultative passive with the auxiliary sein ‘to be’ (e.g.,
das Kind ist gewaschen ‘the child is in a washed state’) is acquired earlier
than the nonresultative werden-passive as in (1) above, presumably be-
cause the acquisition of the sein-passive is facilitated by the semantically
related and formally identical present perfect with the auxiliary to be (das
Kind ist gewachsen ‘the child has grown’). Such facilitatory e¤ects of
related constructions were also demonstrated by connectionist networks
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(Morris et al. 2000). Here, the acquisition of grammatical construction is
seen in terms of family resemblance structures where their relationship
cannot be reduced to one factor alone. Rather, in a bottom-up fashion
more and more similarities between seemingly unrelated constructions
are discovered as a function of growing experience with language.
Finally, there is research as to which properties of a language facilitate
abstraction. From a crosslinguistic perspective it seems rather strange, for
example, that children take relatively long to acquire English morphology
although there are only very few paradigms to acquire. Given the syntac-
tic properties of English, namely a relatively ﬁxed word order and little
variation in the form of words, it seems that English is more susceptible
to the entrenchment of lexically speciﬁc patterns because identical strings
of words are more likely to occur. That is, English has high token fre-
quency and less type variation. Languages with more variation in both
word order and word forms, in contrast, show more type variation and
lower token frequency, such that abstraction processes may start earlier.
This interdependence of type and token frequency may explain why
English-speaking children take relatively long to acquire the little mor-
phology there is, whereas children learning highly inﬂectional languages
seem to perform better and to start earlier (Slobin 1973).
But corpus data alone only give limited evidence about the underlying
mental representation: it may well be that a certain collocation is highly
frequent and shows little variation or linkage with other construction, but
may nevertheless be fully analyzed. Thus, the results from corpus studies
must be compared to results from experimental studies that test produc-
tivity (e.g., nonce-words experiments, priming studies). Here, results point
in the same direction of rather limited competence initially (Tomasello
2000a).
3.1.2. Social and cognitive prerequisites for language learning processes.
In its current version, usage-based acquisition theory is the result of
convergent evidence from the domain of social-cognitive development,
pattern recognition and schema abstraction abilities. Language learning
seems to be based on three sources
(i) Social cognition
(ii) Constraints on working memory
(iii) Generalization mechanisms (see Sections 3.2 and 3.3)
(i) Social cognition
Tomasello and Rakoczy (2003) argue that social development is what
possibly demarcates the human species from other animals. In their
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view, social cognition leads to di¤erences in the various kinds of learning
processes. Whereas humans are able to make use of imitative learning,
where they start o¤ from the goal of the action, animals seem only to be
able to use emulative learning, where they replicate the action without re-
course to the goal of the action. Meltzo¤ (1995) asked 18-month-old chil-
dren to imitate an action they just saw, whereby the facial expression of
the experimenter suggested that he or she had failed to achieve the results.
E.g., the experimenter was pulling at the cap of a pen as if to make the
cap come o¤. However, the cap did not come o¤. It turned out that chil-
dren did not imitate what they saw but what they thought the experi-
menter tried to achieve, e.g., they pulled o¤ the cap of the pen rather
than just pulling at the cap. In their review of the literature on social be-
havior in humans and nonhuman species, Tomasello and Rakoczy (2003)
conclude that humans show cultural transmission of knowledge in a way
that has not yet been observed in animals.
The species-speciﬁc behaviors shown by children are joint attention,
and the understanding of others as intentional agents, including the
awareness that their mental state may vary from others’ (Tomasello and
Rakoczy 2003). If we assume that children are good at working out the
intention underlying the verbal utterances of others, they have a head
start into the linguistic system. It still needs to be worked out in detail,
however, how children map their pragmatic knowledge onto linguistic
forms. Tomasello argues that children’s earliest utterances, typically one-
word phrases, represent communicative acts (Tomasello 2003a). I.e., they
form a construction (form/function pairing) that can be di¤erentiated
and reanalyzed as children proceed.
(ii) Constraints on working memory
One of the puzzles in language acquisition research is why small children
with their limited cognitive resources are so good at language learning, a
rather complex task, but they fail at other, seemingly simpler tasks. A
possible answer is that it is exactly children’s limited working memory
that focuses their attention to the relationships between words or seg-
ments in close proximity (cf. Clark 2003: 413–416 for a summary). This
assumption became known as the starting small hypothesis (Newport
1990; Elman 1993).
In training experiments with Tamarin monkeys and human adults on
sequences of nonsense syllables where regularities held between nonadja-
cent segments or syllables, Newport et al. (2004: 112) conclude that ‘‘for
regularities among elements that are at moderate distances from one
another, a cognitively limited learner might be more capable than a
learner with greater cognitive capacities.’’
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In a neural network study, Elman (1993) was able to show that the
network was able to learn complex structures only if it was trained on
shorter sequences before, and when the viewing window was limited.
When the model was fed with input that was too long and complex, it
failed to generalize (also see Culicover and Nowak 2003).
The connectionist model MOSAIC was employed by Freudenthal et al.
(2002) to simulate the stages of acquisition regarding nonﬁnite and ﬁnite
forms in English and Dutch. The model managed to acquire verbal inﬂec-
tion in the order of acquisition similar to that attested in child learners,
simply by enlarging the model’s working memory and by processing the
input sentences, all of which were questions from right to left (because
the end of the sentence is what children hear last). Consider the Dutch
sentence papa wil koekje eten ‘daddy wants cookie eat-INF’. If one as-
sumes that language processing proceeds incrementally from right to left
and that function words are often omitted, the model predicts the acqui-
sition sequence eat-INF! cookie eat-INF! daddy cookie eat-INF. This
sequence is a typical developmental sequence attested in Dutch children.
In a recent adaptation of the model (Freudenthal et al. 2005, 2006) a pri-
macy bias was added, such that the model also processed utterance initial
clusters. This enabled the network to use declarative and imperative sen-
tences as input as well. With these additions, the model could simulate the
language-speciﬁc di¤erences in optional inﬁnitive phenomena in English,
Dutch, German, and Spanish. This suggests that attention to salient posi-
tions (the end and the beginning of utterances) combined with a growing
working memory enabled the MOSAIC model to generate sequences typ-
ically found in early child language, and to simulate language-speciﬁc dif-
ferences in acquisition.
3.2. Pattern recognition and generalization over positive input
In order to induce linguistic rules, children need powerful generalization
skills. Three components can be distinguished: First, learners must be
able to recognize patters. Second, they must be able to compare patterns
and generalize, i.e., to abstract schemas. This type of schema abstraction
is still built on generalization over positive evidence. Third, they must
command inferencing skills like analogical reasoning such that they gen-
eralize schemas that are not attested in the input. In the following I will
review two types of learning mechanisms, those based on pattern recogni-
tion in positive evidence, and those based on analogical reasoning with-
out positive evidence. The common idea is that learning language consists
of pattern recognition and generalization over these patterns such that
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language structure can be induced from distributional patterns (Klein and
Manning 2002, 2004).5
Stochastic models of acquisition became highly inﬂuential in the past
decade. It turned out that infants are highly e‰cient pattern recognizers,
when exposed to series of nonsense syllables. These pattern recognition
skills are skills that can be used to discover linguistic regularities or rules
(Newport and Aslin 2004). Most likely, some of these pattern recognition
skills are not uniquely human (cf. Newport et al. 2004 for a detailed dis-
cussion). Recently, Hudson Kam and Newport (2005) showed that chil-
dren can even repair inconsistencies in the input patterns, and thus show
that children start to regularize based on positive evidence.
These results suggest that children pay close attention to the input pat-
terns they hear. This is also conﬁrmed by studies that analyze the overlap
of child and adult language. Behrens (2003, 2005, 2006) studied the distri-
bution of part-of-speech categories in extensive corpora of German child
and adult language. She found that (a) the distribution of linguistic cate-
gories like part-of-speech distribution was extremely stable over time in
the input, and that (b) the child approaches the adult distributional pat-
terns within a year or two, depending on the structure under investiga-
tion. Such input orientation is also documented in crosslinguistic studies
on children’s categorization of spatial relations, where early language spe-
ciﬁcity is observed (e.g., Choi and Bowerman 1991; see Slobin 2001 for a
summary).
Also, children’s reliance on positive evidence does not only allow them
to acquire the simple structures of language, but also complex ones.
Diessel (2004) demonstrated how English-speaking children gradually
acquire complement clauses. They start out from a semantically limited
use of the main clause in a modifying way (e.g., they used the clause
‘‘I think’’ like an adverbial), and proceed to generalize to di¤erent types
of syntactic dependencies.
Once patterns are abstracted, priming e¤ects should show this. Priming
is based on the idea that since knowledge is connected, the activation of
cognitive content activates related content. E.g., hearing the word sheep
activates lexical entries that are semantically or phonologically related
(e.g., goat or shawl). In language production, experienced speakers show
priming e¤ects such that related constructions are activated in the mental
lexicon. Priming thus indicates that children have built mental networks.
Savage et al. (2003) tested children’s use of passives in a priming design
where children were presented pictures with active or passive sentences.
They were asked to repeat the sentence, and then to describe the picture.
3- and 4-year olds showed lexical priming only, i.e., they repeated the
verb they heard. 6-year-olds, however, also showed structural priming,
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i.e., they used the active or passive structure they heard with new lexical
material.
If learning is based on positive evidence, another relevant question is
what type of evidence enhances learning. Recently, two training studies
were carried out that experimented with di¤erent types of learning. Child-
ers and Tomasello (2001) analyzed the di¤erential role of type and token
frequency. Ambridge et al. (2006) studied the e¤ect of timing in terms of
massed vs. spaced learning.
3.2.1. The role of type and token frequency. The interplay between type
and token frequency provides the basis for generalization. Type and to-
ken frequency play di¤erent roles in the process: High token frequency
leads to entrenchment by leaving strong memory traces, whereas type
variation leads to abstraction (cf. Tomasello 2003: 173–175). In a training
study, Childers and Tomasello (2001) tested the e¤ect of di¤erent types of
input. In three sessions, children were trained on 16 novel transitive ac-
tions where a stu¤ed animal did something to an inanimate object. Each
action was commented upon by the investigator with 6 repetitions of
a transitive sentence of various types. That is, during the three training
sessions, the children heard 288 transitive sentences. Children were as-
signed to one of ﬁve training conditions. A control group played these
games without verbal input. In the four verbal conditions, the actions
were named with familiar or unfamiliar verbs and the subjects and objects
were encoded either with a full NP or with pronouns only (cf. Examples
[3a]–[3d]).
(3) Two-noun condition with (a) known or (b) unfamiliar verb
a. Look, the bird is swinging the bathtub. See? The bird is swinging
the bathtub.
b. Look, the dog is hurling the chair. See? The dog is hurling the
chair.
Two-pronoun condition with (a) known or (b) unfamiliar verb
c. Look, the cow is pulling the car. See? He’s pulling it.
d. Look, the bear is striking the tree. See? He’s striking it.
In the fourth session, children were tested on new transitive actions with
pseudoverbs. The success of training was measured by the number of chil-
dren (out of 10 per group) who produced at least one transitive sentence
with the novel verbs. Even by this very lenient criterion of productivity,
only two children in the control condition managed to produce a transi-
tive sentence with a novel verb. Children in the noun conditions per-
formed a little better, but did not di¤er signiﬁcantly from the control con-
dition. Only the children in the pronoun condition showed a signiﬁcant
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learning e¤ect, regardless of whether they were exposed to familiar or un-
familiar verbs during the training phase (Childers and Tomasello 2001:
742). These results show that modiﬁcations in the input properties have
an e¤ect in learning abstract syntactic constructions. Only those children
that received training were able to generalize. The results also indicate
that stability and variation have di¤erent roles in development: children
in the ﬁxed pronoun condition managed best, although it is unclear
whether they had to rely on abstract linguistic knowledge about transitive
sentences to do so. Variation in the NPs did not facilitate learning of tran-
sitive constructions very much, but such variation in the arguments may
help children to learn something about the verb meaning (cf. the notion of
syntactic bootstrapping, Gleitman 1990; Naigles 1990; Ho¨hle this issue).
3.2.2. The e¤ect of massed and spaced learning. If frequency matters,
does distribution in timing matter as well? This is the question underlying
the massed versus spaced learning paradigm. In massed training, all evi-
dence is presented at once. In spaced learning, the evidence is distributed
over time, i.e., subjects are presented with the data over several sessions.
Ambridge et al. (2006) found that various types of distributional learning
had a better e¤ect than a massed presentation. Studies of this type can
also be used to investigate the minimum number of examples needed to
learn, and the optimal distribution of evidence over time.
While these training studies investigate how children generalize based
on positive evidence, other researchers focused on learning situations
where positive evidence was missing, and where children had to rely on
their generalization skills in order to induce the missing link.
3.3. Generalization over indirect positive evidence
At ﬁrst glance, generalization without positive evidence seems to consti-
tute a problem for usage-based approaches because they emphasize that
linguistic structure is derived from language use, that is, production
data. However, usage-based acquisition can even work on missing evi-
dence, as long as the cognitive resources to deduce missing evidence are
available to children. As of yet, evidence for generalization over missing
evidence comes from connectionist models.
Elman (2003) argues that the key to acquisition of complex linguistic
rules might well be indirect positive evidence, which relies on children’s
ability to generalize across domains. Morris et al. (2000) showed that a
simple recurrent network was able to produce a supposedly unlearnable
construction, even without positive evidence, but on the basis of simpler
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utterances that contained the relevant morphosyntactic information. The
construction at stake is question formation from sentences with em-
bedded clauses like The boy who is smoking is crazy. Inversion based on
simple linear order (the ﬁrst ‘‘is’’) would lead to the incorrect question Is
the boy who _ smoking is crazy? The child must recognize that question
formation is structure dependent and must have knowledge that the sec-
ond ‘‘is’’, which is part of the main clause, needs to be fronted in order to
come to the correct question: Is the boy who is smoking _ crazy? Elman’s
(2003) network was able to generate such complex questions on the basis
of having learned simple utterances that provided
(i) evidence for agreement, subcategorization, and selectional restric-
tions
(e.g., The women smoke_ cigarettes; The boy is funny)
(ii) evidence for question formation in simple sentences
(e.g., Can you read this? Is she friendly?)
(iii) evidence for complex sentences and noun phrase constituency
(e.g., The girl with the cat is nice. I like the teacher who speaks
Spanish.)
The network generated the complex sentence from knowledge of sim-
pler sentences that contained the relevant components of the complex
structure.
In developmental psychology, the concept of structure mapping (Gent-
ner 2003) is one that can be applied to the problem of generalizing over
missing evidence. Structure mapping is a form of complex analogical rea-
soning that allows us to draw alignments across domains (Gentner 2003).
To my knowledge, this concept has not yet been applied to experiments
on language learning.
To sum up, usage-based approaches to acquisition explain language
learning by a combination of powerful generalization mechanisms with
sophisticated social skills which help the child to overcome the problem
of semantic indeterminacy. Due to schema formation and comparisons
across schemas, the representations become more abstract, qualitatively
new representations emerge.
4. Applications of usage-based approaches in other domains
The vast majority of studies in the emergentist framework is concerned
with unimpaired, monolingual ﬁrst language acquisition. The emphasis
is on (a) word learning, (b) morphosyntactic development and (c) dis-
course patterns (see Tomasello 2003a). Less attention has been paid to
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phonological and prosodic development, or to semantics and pragmatics.
In principle, usage-based acquisition research should address these do-
mains using the same concepts and methods.
4.1. Language disorders
There is extensive work on language development under impairment.
Again, the key assumption of emergentist approaches is that phenotype
and genotype are in no direct relation, but that rather small aberrations
in the genotype can have wide-ranging e¤ects in the phenotype because
of an extended developmental trajectory (Karmilo¤-Smith 1998, 2004).
Likewise, research on children with frontal lesions has shown that the
brain shows high plasticity, rather than deterministic localization for
higher cognitive functions (Elman et al. 1996).
4.2. Multilingualism
To date, there is a lack of studies on multilingualism, be it childhood or
adult bilingualism or second language learning. Hernandez et al. (2005)
developed a competition model of how children can distinguish and build
up multiple language systems based on experience. They argue that chil-
dren will be able to construe modular multiple grammars based on the
competition between cues, and predict entrenchment of units belonging
to the di¤erent languages to be learned. Ellis (2002, 2008) shows that fre-
quency factors account for several aspects of second language learning as
well as language change.
5. Open issues and new directions
There are a number of open issues that need to be addressed in more de-
tail in future research. These open issues include the comparison between
child and adult representations, the acquisition of semantics, the con-
struction of meaning in discourse, and the study of individual di¤erences.
5.1. Child and adult representations
More comparative research between adults and children needs to be done
in order to establish how language is represented, especially regarding
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holistic and analytic storage of related forms. Usage-based approaches
predict that there should be quantitative di¤erences, because adults are
able to store larger sequences, but they can also store items with a higher
degree of abstraction because they have had more experience with
language.
5.2. The acquisition of semantics
Although usage-based theories are functional theories of language, there
is a lack of hypotheses and studies regarding the acquisition of function
or meaning proper. E.g., if one assumes that even prelinguistic children
are good at identifying the intentions of others, how does this contribute
to the understanding and reﬁnement of the semantics of the utterances
that the child processes? A possible answer lies in the study of interactive
processes in order to investigate how meaning is established in discourse.
In usage-based theory, meaning is a ﬂexible concept with prototype ef-
fects (Langacker 2000). Our representations of meaning will change if
we hear a construction is used in a di¤erent fashion. In order to trace
this process, detailed corpus studies or training studies on small scale
changes will have to be carried out.
5.3. Relationship between quantitative and qualitative learning processes
The success of cluster analyses, probabilistic and connectionist models in
learning processes, as well as the experimental research with infants on
pattern recognition suggest that language learning can be explained to a
large degree by quantitative learning processes. It is as of yet unknown
how the registering of quantity information proceeds exactly (cf. the dis-
cussion on exemplar based models and growing abstractness of linguistic
representations above).
Although researchers in the usage-based paradigm do not propose that
child language acquisition is merely stochastic, qualitative aspects of
learning situations are not as widely discussed. Ku¨ntay and Slobin
(2002) criticize the current treatment of corpora because as soon as con-
versation data are entered into a database, they are only considered in
quantitative fashion. However, they point out that real learning takes
place in concrete discourse situations and explore the types of interactive
patterns that enhance language learning. They identiﬁed so-called varia-
tion sets as one possible context for abstracting linguistic knowledge.
Variation sets are characterized as reformulations where the form varies
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but the content stays the same. In example (4) a father reformulates a
request for information in ﬁve di¤erent ways:
(4) Father to son, age 2;3
Who did we see when we went to the store?
Who did we see?
Who did we see in the store?
Who did we see today?
When we went out to shopping, who did we see?
(Ku¨ntay and Slobin 2002)
In terms of function, variation sets typically are control oriented (call for
child’s action), ideational (provide information), or information querying
(prompt for child). Variation in form concerns lexical substitution and
rephrasing, addition and deletion of referential terms, and reordering of
constituents.
5.4. Individual di¤erences
In usage-based approaches, di¤erences in input language matter — both
from a crosslinguistic as well as from a language-speciﬁc perspective.
More research is needed regarding the e¤ect of quantitative and qualita-
tive features of the input on individual children’s course of language
development and success in language development. In a large cross-
sectional study, Hart and Risley (1995) found that children’s language de-
velopment highly correlated with the quantity of the input they received.
Here, dynamic system models (e.g., Hockema and Smith this issue) which
assume that each learning step depends on the individual state of the sys-
tem provide a powerful conceptual and methodological tool to under-
stand di¤erent learning outcomes.
6. Summary
In cognitive linguistics, constructions are the basic linguistic units. They
are deﬁned as form-function pairings of any size, for example mor-
phemes, words, clauses, or sentences. The emphasis on the interrelation-
ship between form and meaning made cognitive linguistics an appropriate
framework for those acquisition researchers who emphasize the commu-
nicative basis for language acquisition and who assume that pragmatics
and semantics are powerful cues in the acquisition process (see Tomasello
1998a, 1998b, Tomasello 2000b, and Diessel 2004: Chapter 2, for a de-
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tailed account of the possible links between acquisition research and cog-
nitive linguistics). This claim is supported by ﬁndings in linguistic and
nonlinguistic domains that the mind can store information in multiple
ways, i.e., there is analytic and holistic storage (see Section 2.5; see also
Weinert in this issue for the importance of redundant encoding in implicit
learning processes).
The aim of cognitive linguistics is to be maximalist, i.e., to integrate all
factors that are needed to systematically explain all aspects of all linguis-
tic e¤ects (Langacker 1988). Systematicity in the treatment of linguistic
phenomena is achieved by establishing the network-like relationships be-
tween di¤erent constructions (see Section 3.1.1).
Cognitive linguistics is regarded as a perspective on the organization
and representation of language that is highly compatible with linguistic
facts (see the contributions in Tomasello 1998a and 2003b). In this sense,
the theory is eclectic because it relies on converging evidence from linguis-
tic and from learning theories. Although this eclecticism makes the usage-
based approach less cohesive as a theory in the philosophical sense (see
Jordan 2004 and Russell 2004 for extensive discussions of this issue), this
eclecticism or integrativeness is seen as the more realistic approach when
dealing with complex and multifaceted issues like language use and lan-
guage learning. As stated above, many cognitive linguists do not strive
for economy of representation or elegance of the theory (cf. Tomasello
1995), because there is no evidence that parsimony has psychological
reality since the brain allows for multiple ways of storage and processing.
A major tenet of usage-based approaches is that language has to be
learned on the basis of experience, because no innate linguistic represen-
tations are assumed. Therefore, a number of studies were conducted that
showed that children’s early competence was limited. Usage-based ap-
proaches are inspired by studies on the generalization skills of infants
and young children. Thus, the focus in the usage-based approach changes
from emphasizing the limited productivity of early child language to the
study of the exact learning mechanisms and the stochastic basis for ab-
stracting generalizations.
The converging evidence from developmental and computational
studies make data driven learning appear more likely than was expected
a decade ago. There is a growing body of evidence that structural proper-
ties of language can be induced from, for example, co-occurrence rela-
tionships. Also, there is a growing body of evidence that even very young
children are very good at pattern recognition and schema abstraction,
such that they are able to generalize over inconsistencies in the input and
to make use of indirect positive evidence. In this sense, linguistic compe-
tence is an emergent property of language use.
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The usage-based approach is falsiﬁable if it can be shown that there are
linguistic phenomena which cannot possibly be learned on the basis of
(direct and indirect) experience. This challenge is known as the poverty
of the stimulus argument. However, even if truly ‘‘unlearnable’’ phenom-
ena could be identiﬁed, this would not automatically constitute evidence
for innateness of the linguistic knowledge underlying this phenomenon.
For that, it also needs to be demonstrated that an attested feature of uni-
versal grammar does explain the acquisition of such a phenomenon.
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1. Langacker (1987) used the term ‘‘particular’’ to refer to actual usage events and their
storage. In later acquisition research, the term ‘‘concrete’’ became used (e.g., Tomasello
1998b).
2. The use of terminology reﬂects di¤erences in emphasis. E.g., Tomasello (2003) does not
mention the term emergentism, but puts forward a usage-based theory that strongly em-
phasises the social roots of language development, whereas the term emergentism seems
to be preferred in the computational and neurolinguistic literature (see Elman et al.
1996, and the articles in MacWhinney 1999). But the concept of ‘‘emergence’’ is also
used in nativist approaches (see Hohenberger and Peltzer-Karpf this issue). The di¤er-
ence lies in the assumptions regarding the initial state of linguistic representation, and
the linguistic framework used. Russell (2004) distinguishes between connectionist and
other usage-based approaches by placing connectionism into the empiricist tradition of
thought, whereas he categorizes usage-based approaches as pragmatist because of the
emphasis on the social foundations of language learning. Both are contrasted with the
rationalist paradigm that underlies generative theories of language acquisition.
3. The phrasing is deliberately vague because current comparative research aims at identi-
fying the cognitive skills in other species in order to deﬁne the delineation to humans.
For example, dogs are better than nonhuman primates on social cognition tasks (Hare
et al. 2002), monkeys demonstrate pattern recognition skills (Newport et al. 2004;
Hauser et al. 2001), and dogs show word learning strategies similar to those of children
(Kaminski et al. 2004).
4. Russell (2004: 79) points out that Chomsky in the Minimalist Framework changed his
view such that instead of linguistic representations, the process ‘‘merge’’ is the basic op-
eration of language. However, in contrast to usage-based theories, this process is consid-
ered to be domain-speciﬁc to language. Note that in more recent publications, the prin-
ciple of ‘‘recursion’’ is seen as the central characteristic of human language in the narrow
sense, with an ongoing debate of whether this process is domain speciﬁc (Fitch et al.
2005).
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5. Distributional learning is compatible with nativist approaches as well, because one does
not make assumptions about where the categories come from (see Redington et al.
1998). They can be emergent or pre-speciﬁed. Likewise, stochastic grammars can be
modular or nonmodular (Jurafsky 2003: 90).
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